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eposit insurance was introduced in the United States during
the Great Depression primarily to promote financial stability.
Stability is enhanced because deposit insurance reduces the
likelihood of a bank run. During its first four decades, deposit insurance
appeared to work well as few banks failed. But in the 1980s, a wave of
financial troubles in the banking and thrift industry exposed an unfor-
tunate side of deposit insurance—moral hazard. In other words, deposit
insurance encouraged undercapitalized depository institutions to take
excessive risk. 
The crisis in the 1980s was most acute for thrifts because they were
functioning with very little capital. A large number of thrifts failed
depleting the insurance fund and necessitating a taxpayer bailout. The
bank insurance fund was severely reduced as a result of bank failures.
Extensive reforms in 1991 were designed to prevent a recurrence of such
problems. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement
Act, or FDICIA, focuses on preventing moral hazard, which many
observers claim was a major cause of the crisis.
Today’s banking system is not in crisis. In fact, most banks are doing
well. Still, both houses of Congress are debating new ways to reform
deposit insurance. The view of many in the banking industry is that cur-
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rently deposit insurance has a number of flaws. For example, FDICIA
was designed to introduce risk-based premiums for deposit insurance,
but in practice most banks have not paid any premiums since 1996.
Another problem is that, under the current system, premiums can
swing sharply, which creates uncertainty for banks. Premium swings
have become a concern recently as several factors have led the fund to
shrink so that, for the first time in several years, most banks may have to
pay premiums.
While there is wide agreement, at least in principle, on some of the
above issues, other issues are more open to debate. One such issue con-
cerns the amount of coverage, which has not changed in nominal terms
since 1980 and which is half of what it was in 1980 in real terms. This
situation leads some to believe that the amount of coverage should be
increased to compensate, at least partly, for what has been lost to infla-
tion. Those who believe that moral hazard is a big problem, however,
oppose an increase in coverage, hoping that inflation will continue to
erode the real value of the coverage and thus reduce moral hazard to a
level they find acceptable.
This article provides a guide to key issues in the current deposit
insurance debate. The first section gives a brief history of deposit insur-
ance, exploring the roots of the problems that concern the industry
today. The second section provides an overview of the current reform
proposals as they relate to three issues: the size of the fund, the structure
of insurance premiums and rebates, and insurance coverage. 
I. DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES
To  understand the current reform proposals it is useful to know
how deposit insurance works. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC) provides a guarantee to depositors that they will not lose
their funds up to a certain limit in case of bank failure. This assurance
reduces the likelihood of bank runs. Unfortunately, deposit insurance
can also lead to excessive risk taking by banks and thrifts, as happened
in the 1980s. The current design of deposit insurance tries to balance
the benefits of financial stability with the risks created by the moral
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Deposit insurance promotes financial stability but can create 
moral hazard
Deposit insurance was designed to prevent banks runs, or panics.
Bank runs arise when too many depositors decide to withdraw their
funds at the same time. A bank cannot service all of its depositors at one
time because it typically has very liquid liabilities, such as deposits—but
illiquid assets, such as loans and mortgages. This liquidity imbalance is
usually not a problem, since large numbers of depositors rarely need to
withdraw all their funds at the same time. But if too many depositors
worry that their funds are not safe because other depositors are with-
drawing their funds, the fear of panic becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The result is a bank run.
Economists call such situations coordination failures, because
panics could be avoided if depositors were able to coordinate their
actions. From the perspective of an individual depositor, withdrawing
early is rational because the bank will be short of funds if it is run. Yet
the bank can fail unnecessarily. It may have been able to service all
depositors if they had been patient. 
Deposit insurance offers depositors a guarantee that their insured
funds are safe. This guarantee promotes financial stability because it
takes away the fear of the panic, which is the root of bank runs. Unfor-
tunately, this guarantee also promotes moral hazard. Moral hazard refers
to excessive risk taking by individuals or institutions facing small poten-
tial losses and large potential gains. The owners of a bank with low
capital have incentives to take high risks because they have little to lose
when their investments fail and much to gain when they succeed.
Indeed, limited liabilities mean that the most they can lose is their
capital while all the profits accrue to them.1
Without deposit insurance depositors would have a strong incen-
tive to monitor bank’s behavior because their funds would be at risk.
Depositors might ask riskier banks for higher interest rates, or they
might move their funds from riskier banks to safer banks. Thus, absent
deposit insurance, the risk taking behavior of banks can potentially be
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stake in the financial health of their bank. In that way, deposit insur-
ance weakens market discipline and may actually promote risk taking
by an undercapitalized bank.
Two approaches to reduce the moral hazard problem are regulation
and supervision. Regulators can use capital requirements to limit a bank’s
incentives to take risks. If banks hold more capital, owners have more to
lose in case of failure. Supervisors monitor a bank’s portfolio to assess its
risk characteristics. These two approaches go hand in hand to minimize
moral hazard. Information obtained through the supervision process is
used by regulators for the purpose of enforcing capital requirements. A
third approach is to charge premiums based on the risk imposed on the
insurance fund. If risk could be measured adequately, risk-based premi-
ums would discourage excessive risk taking. 
A successful deposit insurance mechanism must balance the bene-
fits of financial stability and the costs of moral hazard. Reforms to
deposit insurance tried to mitigate moral hazard when it became an
obvious problem in the 1980s. The reforms currently being debated are
still trying to get the balance right.
Deposit insurance from its origin to the 1980s crisis
Deposit insurance was adopted in 1933 in response to the many
bank suspensions since the beginning of the Great Depression.2
Whereas an average of about 600 banks were suspended every year from
1921 to 1929, that average climbed to over 2,250 from 1930 to 1934,
with 4,000 suspensions in 1933 alone. 
When deposit insurance became effective in 1934, it contributed to
a substantial decrease in the number of bank failures. From 1934 to
1941 the number of bank failures handled by the newly created FDIC
fell to 370, a little over 50 banks a year. In the 40 years from 1940 to
1979, on average only seven banks failed every year (Chart 1). 
Until the 1980s, deposit insurance functioned very well. While
there was no apparent need for major changes, deposit insurance under-
went some modifications. One important change was an increase in the
FDIC’s use of purchase and assumption (P&A) transactions as a way of
resolving banks.3 As indicated in the FDIC’s resolution handbook: “A
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some or all of the assets of a failed bank or thrift and assumes some or all
of the liabilities, including all insured deposits.” In the 1960s and 1970s
most failing banks were resolved through P&A, implicitly extending
coverage to uninsured deposits.
The statutory coverage level was also increased in nominal terms six
times, from $2,500 in 1934 to $100,000 in 1980. In real terms, the
coverage in 1980 was about three times as high as in 1934, but inflation
since 1980 has eroded its value. It is currently a little less than half of
what it was in 1980.
The number of bank and thrift failures increased dramatically in
the early 1980s and remained high for about a decade. From 1983 to
1992, on average almost 150 banks and 120 thrifts closed every year,
with 280 bank failures in 1988 and 327 thrift failures in 1989.
Although there were many factors contributing to the failures, it is gen-
erally agreed that moral hazard played an important role.
If moral hazard is partly to blame for the 1980s crisis, why did it take
over 45 years to manifest itself? Several factors exacerbated the problem:
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Some analysts have argued that the rise of nonbank financial insti-
tutions, such as pension and mutual funds, increased the competition
for individual investors’ funds (Edwards; Sellon). This trend started as
early as the second half of the 1950s. By making depository institutions
compete for funds, the rise of nonblank financial institution could have
contributed to the severity of the 1980s crisis.
In addition, high inflation in the 1970s pushed interest rates above
the maximum rates that banks and thrifts were allowed to offer their
depositors. Because banking regulation prevented interest rates on
deposits from increasing, these institutions found it difficult to attract
funds. To help thrifts compete for funds, regulatory reforms allowed
thrifts to issue new types of instruments, and interest rate ceilings were
gradually phased out.4
These changes, however, did not solve the problem. Thrifts were
now paying higher interest rates to obtain funds than they were getting
on their assets, which were almost exclusively one-family home mort-
gages. This profit squeeze drained capital from the industry. Also, the
market value of the long-term assets held by thrifts dropped substan-
tially in the 1980s when interest rates increased, leaving much of the
industry insolvent on a market value basis.
Deregulation in the first half of the 1980s was intended to enable
the thrift industry to recover on its own from these problems. Thrifts
were authorized to make commercial real estate and commercial loans.
Thus, institutions with virtually no capital were able to invest in risky
ventures in which they had very little expertise. Taking such risks made
sense for these owners who had little at stake. Moreover, depositors had
no incentives to monitor these thrifts’ behavior because the deposits
used to make these investments were insured. Some have argued that
the lack of adequate supervision meant that nothing was done to keep
this risk taking behavior in check. 
The thrift crisis became so severe that a taxpayer bailout was neces-
sary. The cost to the taxpayers and the thrift industry was estimated to
be over $150 billion. Most of the cost, $120 billion, was borne by the
taxpayer (Curry and Shibut). 
Banks fared better but were hit hard nonetheless. The banking
industry was also suffering from increased competition for deposits.
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of Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts for thrifts.5 Large
brokerage firms also started to compete by offering money market
mutual funds. These funds were extremely successful. From 1977 to
1981, NOW accounts grew from $5 billion to $78.5 billion, and
money market mutual funds grew from $3.8 billion to $188 billion. In
contrast, demand deposits at banks stayed essentially flat over the same
period, falling from $247 billion to $243 billion.
Competition increased on the assets side of banks’ balance sheets as
well. Foreign commercial banks started to compete with domestic
banks in the U.S. commercial loan market. Some large corporations
began to raise funds directly from the commercial paper market rather
than through banks. Finally, auto manufacturers and other nonfinancial
firms expanded their activities in the market for consumer loans. 
The increasing competition decreased the charter value of banks.6
Declining charter value can make the moral hazard problem greater
because owners have less at stake in their investment. Moral hazard
appears to have become a greater problem in the 1980s because increas-
ingly banks whose charter value was below average were more likely to
take higher risk (Keeley).
Banks also suffered from a series of shocks in the 1980s. Small
regional banks were hurt by bubbles in energy and agricultural land
prices. Some large banks held significant amounts of debt from lesser
developed countries in the early 1980s. These loans lost most of their
values in 1982 as Mexico and about 40 other countries defaulted.
Shocks such as these led to many bank failures. They also contributed
to a decrease in bank capital, which set the stage for greater incentives
to take risks.
The banking industry overall was not affected as much as thrifts,
and taxpayers’ funds were not needed to replenish the Bank Insurance
Fund (BIF). The FDIC’s estimate of its own cost from the banking
crisis is about $30 billion. Nevertheless, the failure of a large number of
banks and thrifts had several other costs that were harder to quantify. In
particular, the cost of misdirected resources in banks and thrifts lending
was probably much higher than FDIC and taxpayer losses. 36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
Congress passed FDICIA in 1991 in response to the crisis in the
banking and thrift industry. FDICIA’s three main goals were to recapi-
talize the insurance fund, enforce capital requirements more strictly, and
introduce risk-based premiums.
Under FDICIA, the FDIC was required to recapitalize the BIF and
the newly created Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF). Both
funds introduced a minimum assessment rate of 23 basis points (23
cents for $100 of insured deposits) for all insured institutions. This rate
was required to be in effect as long as the ratio of reserves to estimated
insured deposits was below a designated reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.25
percent. Once the fund reached that threshold, the minimum assess-
ment rate became $2,000. This minimum assessment rate was reduced
to zero by Congress in 1996. 
FDICIA introduced several measures to minimize the impact of
bank failures on the insurance fund. The primary measures were
prompt corrective action (PCA) and least-cost resolution (LCR). PCA
provisions provide guidelines to limit the actions of banks with a low
capital-to-assets ratio. Critically undercapitalized banks (banks with
capital-to-assets ratios below 2 percent) can be considered insolvent and
resolved. In principle, this provision should guarantee that the deposit
insurance fund is never needed. In practice, however, it can be difficult
to determine the value of certain assets, and this value can fluctuate.
Consequently, banks cannot always be closed without cost to the fund.
PCA also provides incentives for banks to hold enough capital and
limits their ability to take excessive risk when they have little capital,
precisely when they are most likely to take excessive risk. 
LCR stipulates that failed banks should be resolved in the least
expensive way from the perspective of the insurance fund. The objective
of LCR is to limit the discretion of the FDIC in resolving banks
through purchase and assumption transactions. Since resolutions
through P&A transactions have often meant that the FDIC did absorb
some or all of the losses of uninsured depositors, LCR has been a way of
protecting tax-payers’ money by limiting the cost of failure on the
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The idea behind risk-based premiums is to make depository insti-
tutions pay for the risk they take. If insured institutions paid the same
amount for insurance regardless of the risk they take, they would have
an incentive to take on more risk. Indeed, riskier banks would receive a
subsidy for using more “insurance services,” in expected terms, than less
risky banks. In theory, premiums that reflect the amount of risk being
insured eliminate this incentive.
If the risk characteristics of the assets held by these institutions were
perfectly observable, charging risked-based premiums would completely
eliminate moral hazard. In practice, however, measuring risk is difficult.
Consequently, the effectiveness of risk-based premiums could be limited.
The U.S. banking system since FDICIA
The recovery of the U.S. banking system in the early 1990s was
remarkable. The number of bank failures declined from 280 in 1988, to
127 in 1991, 41 in 1993, and finally just five in 1996. This improve-
ment was due not only to the better health of the existing banks, but
also to the disappearance of many of the weakest institutions. 
When compared with the banking sector, the recovery of the thrift
industry was slower, and the improvement was due to a large extent to
the disappearance of failed institutions. From 1989 to 1995, the
number of institutions regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision
declined more than 50 percent (Benston and Kaufman).7
Both regulatory and economic factors contributed to the recovery.
On the regulatory side, FDICIA helped resolve weak institutions and
gave surviving institutions incentives to increase their capital ratios to
avoid sanctions under PCA. A strengthening economy and low rates of
inflation also helped banks and thrifts recover. The yield curve became
steeper, which is favorable for depository institutions since they typi-
cally lend long term but pay short-term rates. 
A consequence of the recovery was the rapid growth in the Bank
Insurance Fund. The ratio of reserves to estimated insured deposits
reached 1.25 percent in 1995 and the minimum assessment rate was
dropped to zero in 1996. Since then, most banks have not paid insur-
ance premiums.8 Today, close to 95 percent of banks are exempt from
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In 1995, the Savings Association Insurance Fund was still far from
being recapitalized. Thrifts thus had to continue paying premiums
while most banks did not. To prevent a shift from SAIF-insured
deposits to BIF-insured deposits, a special assessment was made in 1996
to recapitalize the SAIF fund.9
Two types of bank and thrifts institutions have benefited dispropor-
tionately from no longer having to pay premiums—those whose
insured deposits have grown faster than average and those that were
created after 1996. New institutions receive all the benefits of deposit
insurance without ever having paid premiums.
Recently, several factors have contributed to a decline in the ratio of
reserves to estimated insured deposits. A number of bank failures have
caused significant losses to the bank insurance fund. Several banks have
had costly failures, implying losses for the fund estimated at 25 to 75
percent of the banks’ assets (Kaufman). In 2001, Superior Bank FSB
failed, costing the FDIC $500 million. Eight banks failed in 2002,
twice as many as last year. Another factor is the substantial increase in
2001 of the reserves the FDIC keeps in anticipation of future failures. A
third factor is the increase in insured deposits due to the conversion of
Cash Management Accounts into deposit accounts by Merrill Lynch
and other securities firms.
These factors have contributed to lowering the ratio of reserves to
estimated insured deposits very close to 1.25 percent for the first time
in several years. This could lead the FDIC to assess premiums on all
banks again. These events have also brought attention to the fact that
under FDICIA premiums can fluctuate widely and, risk being highest
in bad times, premiums must be paid precisely when it is most difficult
for banks to pay them. 
FDICIA helped the banking sector get out of the very difficult sit-
uation it was in at the beginning of the 1990s. However, it has become
apparent that some improvements can be made. The next section dis-
cusses the main reforms currently being proposed and how they are
trying to improve on what FDICIA has already done.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 39
II. KEY ISSUES IN DEPOSIT INSURANCE REFORM
Over the past several years, a number of deposit insurance reform
proposals have been made. In 2000, the FDIC published an options
paper laying out the main ideas. In 2001, economists Alan S. Blinder
and Robert F. Wescott submitted a report on deposit insurance reform
to the FDIC. Later that same year, the FDIC issued detailed recom-
mendations for reform. Many elements of these documents were
incorporated in legislation that passed the House in 2002 (H.R. 3717)
and are expected to be debated by the Senate. While some of these
issues are controversial, there is broad agreement on others. This article
focuses on the heart of current discussions: What is the right size for the
fund? How should premiums and rebates be set? What is the right cov-
erage level and should it be indexed to inflation?
The size of the fund
Two issues concern the size of the fund.10 First, what is the optimal
size? Second, should the Bank Insurance Fund and the Savings Associa-
tion Insurance Fund be merged?
The fund is basically an accounting device. Premiums paid by
banks and thrifts to the FDIC are remitted to the U.S. Treasury. Hence,
the fund keeps track of what has been paid in and, of course, what has
been taken out. As long as the fund is not depleted, the banking sector
as a whole has paid more to the FDIC than was paid to depositors.
But deposit insurance is not limited by the size of the fund. If the
fund were to be depleted, general tax revenues would be used to pay
depositors of failed banks, as happened with the thrift fund after the
1980s crisis. Thus, the size of the fund is a measure of the resources that
the FDIC can access without relying on Congress to appropriate
general tax revenues (Eisenbeis and Wall).
The fund increases with premiums paid and decreases when the
assets of a failed bank cannot repay all of the bank’s insured depositors.
Also, the government debt that is held by the FDIC pays interest that
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fund comes from the fact that this debt is marked to market. In other
words, as the market value of the securities in the fund change, the
measured value of the fund changes as well.
Two main benefits arise from having a high ratio of reserves to
deposits in the fund. First, a high ratio protects the taxpayers’ money.
Second, the FDIC can resolve problem banks in a timely manner.
There is evidence that during the 1980s crisis regulators were unable to
deal properly with a number of insolvent thrifts because the thrift fund
was depleted. These insolvent institutions were allowed to continue to
operate and ended up taking excessive risks in an attempt to avoid
bankruptcy. This behavior raised the final cost of resolving these institu-
tions (FDIC 1997).
While maintaining an insurance fund large enough to handle emer-
gencies is desirable, it is important not to maintain too large a fund. A
large fund is more costly for banks and thrifts, which indirectly hurts
depositors. Premiums affect insured institutions the same as a tax on
deposits and thus alters banks’ behavior. In particular, large premiums
reduce the incentives to obtain funds through deposits. Some of these
costs are ultimately paid by depositors and by borrowers, through an
increase in the cost for banking services, a decrease in the quality of
these services, a lower interest rate paid on deposited funds, or higher
interest rates on loans. Also, financial institutions that do not obtain
their funds through deposits do not have to pay premiums. Hence, the
larger premiums needed to finance a larger fund affect the competitive
balance between different types of financial institutions.11
In practice these costs and benefits are difficult to measure. For
example, estimating the benefit of a larger fund to taxpayers requires
knowing the probability that a fund of a given size will be depleted.
There are no precise estimates of this probability. Similarly, it is hard to
anticipate the behavior of institutions that cannot be closed in a timely
manner because the fund is exhausted.
Despite the difficulty in estimating the correct size of the fund, there
is wide agreement that the current Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR) is
not too far off the mark. One recent study considered some simulations
based on the idea of “minimum optimal fund size” proposed by Robert
Merton (FDIC 2000). For reasonable values of annual deposit growth,
premiums, and the risk-free rate, the study found a range of optimalfund sizes which was close to the current DRR. Some analysts have
noted that a DRR of 1.25 percent has worked well over the last ten years
and, in the absence of compelling reasons to change that level, it might
be wise not to deviate too far from the current DRR (Blinder and
Wescott). For reasons that will be discussed below, some proposals have
suggested that the fund should fluctuate within some bounds. These
bounds are generally centered on, or close to, the current DRR.12
In addition to considering the size of the insurance fund, Congress
is also considering a proposal to merge the funds for banks and thrifts.
Important differences between these two types of institutions in the
past have justified the existence of two separate funds. For example,
until the early 1980s thrifts were limited to investments in a much nar-
rower range of assets than banks. Deregulation has greatly reduced these
differences. Today, over 800 institutions offer both BIF-insured and
SAIF-insured accounts and more than 40 percent of SAIF-insured
deposits are held by commercial banks.
A single fund could have been put in place when FDICIA was
introduced. But such a change was impractical because the thrift indus-
try was in a much more precarious situation than the banking industry.
The cost of recapitalizing the SAIF was much bigger than for the BIF,
and the move to a single fund would have represented a big subsidy to
the thrift industry. Now that both the BIF and the SAIF have been
recapitalized, a merger would be easier to implement. Currently the
reserve ratio of the SAIF is somewhat higher than that of the BIF, but
the difference, and thus the implied subsidy, is relatively small.
From an economic point of view, such a merger makes sense. A
merger would spread the risk of default over a bigger pool of institu-
tions, reducing the odds that the merged insurance fund might be
exhausted. A combined fund would have a lower probability of insol-
vency than either of the funds separately (Oshinsky).
Another benefit from a merged fund would come from simplified
administrative procedures. Currently, institutions that hold both BIF-
and SAIF-insured deposits must keep track of these accounts separately,
which is costly. Also, these accounts might be assessed differently, as BIF
and SAIF premiums need not be the same. When this is the case,
depository institutions have an incentive to spend resources arbitraging
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the difference in assessment between the two funds. Although rational
from the point of view of the depository institutions, such arbitrage is
wasteful from the point of view of society.
The deposit insurance premium structure
Three issues concern the structure of the current system. First, pre-
miums cannot play the incentive role they were designed to play under
FDICIA because most banks do not currently pay premiums. Second,
there is a fundamental conflict between setting the level of premiums
and setting the size of the fund. To reach both targets jointly the system
needs to be modified—for example, by including rebates. Third, the
current system is procyclical. That is, premiums tend to be high when
banks are doing poorly, exactly when it is most difficult for them to pay.
Premiums as an incentive to reduce risk. The objective of risk-based
premiums is to reduce the moral hazard problem by making banks pay
for the risk they impose on the insurance fund. FDICIA required the
FDIC to introduce such premiums. The FDIC chose to separate insti-
tutions into nine different categories, or cells, depending on their
capital ratio (groups 1, 2, and 3) and their supervisory subgroup (sub-
groups A, B, C). Cell 1A contains the highest-rated institutions, while
cell 3C is formed of the worst-rated ones. Each cell can be assessed a
different premium. 
After the introduction of FDICIA, insured institutions were
assessed between 23 and 31 cents per $100 of assessable deposits as
long as the fund was below the DRR. The insurance fund grew much
faster than anticipated, however, and the DRR was reached in 1995.
Most banks were then charged the minimum allowable assessment
which was $2,000. This minimum assessment was eliminated by Con-
gress in 1996, and since then close to 95 percent of banks have paid no
insurance premiums.
Industry analysts generally agree that risk-based premiums are
desirable and that all banks should have to pay something for the bene-
fits they receive from deposit insurance.13 The proposed legislation
would allow the FDIC to charge all banks a strictly positive premium
regardless of capitalization of the fund.14 ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 43
Premium level vs. fund size. If all banks paid positive premiums, it
might be difficult to keep the fund from growing past its target, as the
experience of the 1990s showed. Fundamentally, the problem is that the
desired size of the fund may be incompatible with the desired level of
the premiums. Choosing a given level of premiums induces a particular
size for the fund, but there is no guarantee that the resulting size will be
considered acceptable. Trying to set both the size of the fund and the
premium is like trying to choose independently both the speed at which
a given distance is to be traveled and the total time it takes to reach the
destination. It cannot be done.
If one accepts that the size of the fund should be kept within a
given range, then premiums can be chosen independently only if the
system is modified.15 There must be a way of refunding excess premi-
ums when the fund reaches its limit. The FDIC is recommending that
rebates be based on past contributions rather than on the current assess-
ment base (FDIC 2001). 
Rebates based on the current assessment base are not particularly
desirable. This approach would reduce the cost of insurance and thus
partly undo the incentives created by risk-based premiums. Instead,
because past contributions are predetermined and thus cannot be
modified, basing premiums on past contributions would preserve the
incentive to avoid risk. Of course, forward-looking banks will realize
that the cost of having to pay higher premiums today will be partially
offset by higher rebates in the future. But the direct incentive effect of
risk-based premiums is likely to be much bigger than the expected
increase in rebates in the future, partly because a dollar is less valuable
in the future than today. Additionally, future rebate amounts are
uncertain as they would depend on the size of the fund, which can
fluctuate unpredictably.
Also, basing rebates on past contributions helps make net premi-
ums per deposits more similar across banks of different size. Banks with
more insured deposits pay more gross premiums over time but also
receive larger rebates, which will tend to equalize the net premiums
across banks. Finally, designing rebates in that way would partly com-
pensate banks that paid high premiums before 1996 compared to new
banks that have been benefiting from free deposit insurance.1644 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
There is, however, another way of setting rebates similar to the
FDIC recommendation but that would distort incentives even less.
Rebates could be based on past assessment bases, rather than on past
contributions. Past contributions multiply the amount of deposit
insured by the premiums so that if two banks insure the same amount
of deposits but one bank is riskier that the other, the riskier bank will
have larger future rebates. This has a negative impact on incentives. If,
instead, rebates were based on the amount of past deposits insured, this
negative incentive effect would disappear.
Procyclical premiums. Banks are naturally more likely to fail during
a recession. When banks fail, the size of the insurance fund shrinks. To
recapitalize the fund, assessment rates would have to rise. Thus, premi-
ums are likely to be high at the end of a recession or early into a
recovery, precisely when banks are least able to pay high premiums. 
In the current system, the minimum assessment rate is zero when
the ratio of reserves to deposits is above 1.25 percent. The rate jumps to
23 basis points if the ratio moves below that threshold and if the FDIC
does not project that the fund will move back above the DRR within a
year. With the minimum assessment rate moving from zero to 23 basis
points, the current system is subject to wide swings in premiums.
One proposal to remedy both of these problems is to replace the
DRR with a target range. The House bill proposes a lower bound of
1.15 percent and an upper bound of 1.4 percent. Higher premiums
could be gradually assessed when the ratio of reserves to deposits moves
toward the bottom of the range. When this ratio is close to or above the
top of the range, rebates could increase to limit the growth of the fund.
This would reduce the volatility of the premiums as they would be
modified gradually. It would also delay the response to a decline in the
size of the fund, making premiums less procyclical.
The coverage level
The House bill includes several items concerning the coverage level
for institutions. The general coverage level would rise from $100,000 to
$130,000. The coverage level for retirement accounts would rise from
$100,000 to $260,000. Public depositors, such as state and local govern-
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million. Finally, the coverage limit would be indexed to inflation. The
issue of coverage has attracted the most attention and the most contro-
versy. In particular, the increased level of coverage is opposed by a number
of people, including influential senators, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan, and the Treasury Department (Greenspan; Fisher).
The following discussion explains why the level of coverage must
balance the benefits of financial stability with the moral hazard
problem. It then examines how the coverage level can affect competi-
tion between small and large banks.
Financial stability vs. moral hazard. Choosing the appropriate level
of coverage presents a challenge for policymakers to strike a balance
between promoting financial stability and avoiding moral hazard. On
the one hand, financial stability requires adequate coverage. On the
other hand, a higher coverage level reduces the incentives depositors
have to monitor the behavior of depository institutions. Reduced incen-
tives for depositors can lead to moral hazard which, in turn, requires
additional supervision and regulation if it is to be kept in check.
Discussions on finding the right balance typically focus on the
nominal amount of coverage. But what really matters is the real level of
coverage, defined as the nominal coverage level adjusted for inflation.
As mentioned previously, nominal coverage today is $100,000 and was
last increased from $40,000 in 1980. The real amount of coverage has
declined significantly since 1980 and is now half of what it was then. In
fact, one argument for increasing the nominal coverage is to offset this
erosion in the real level which, while reducing the moral hazard
problem, may have increased the risk of bank runs. It is important to
bear in mind, however, that the change in coverage from $40,000 to
$100,000 at that time constituted a large increase in the real coverage
level, which may have contributed to the 1980s crisis.
Finding the amount of coverage to balance financial stability and
moral hazard is difficult because there is no measure that clearly indi-
cates the stability or fragility of the financial system. Similarly, the
extent of the moral hazard problem cannot be measured precisely, so
the costs of such an increase are hard to predict.
Today, as in 1980, wide disagreement remains about the right cov-
erage level. The disagreement focuses mainly on the extent of the
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oppose any increase in the coverage level. They can point to the expe-
rience of the 1980s, as well as to other empirical evidence, in favor of
their view. One study showed that moral hazard was a problem in the
1980s because the risk taking behavior of banks increased when their
charter value decreased (Keeley). Cross-country evidence also suggests
that moral hazard can be a problem. The results of a study that consid-
ered deposit insurance schemes in a variety of counties indicated that a
higher coverage level tends to make banking crises more likely (Demir-
guç-Kunt and Detragiache).
Nevertheless, not all industry analysts agree that moral hazard is a
critical issue. Some would argue that excessive risk taking should only be
a problem for institutions that do not hold enough capital. According to
this view, incentives to hold capital are provided by PCA provisions so
that moral hazard is not a serious concern given the existing institutional
setting. When deposit insurance was introduced in Canada, for example,
risk taking by banks did not appear to increase (Gueyie and Lai).
These disagreements underscore the difficulty of determining with
precision the appropriate coverage level. To compound the problem, it
is also difficult to know how the desired level of real coverage will evolve
over time. As mentioned above, financial stability depends on the real
amount of coverage being sufficient to cover the demand for deposits
by households. If this demand changes, so should the coverage—but
knowing how the demand for deposits evolves is difficult to predict. 
The demand for deposits might increase over time if household
wealth rises. As people become richer they tend to consume more and
also to increase their savings. Some of these savings are likely to end up
in depository institutions. Consider an extreme example: In a world
where the ratio of wealth to income is constant, and people hold a fixed
share of their wealth in bank deposits, the ratio of nominal deposits to
nominal income would be constant. As this economy grows in real
terms, so would household demand for deposits, again in real terms.
Thus, in this example, it might be desirable to increase the level of real
coverage over time.
There is, however, evidence that the ratio of deposits to wealth is
not constant. Deposits are only one of many assets in household port-
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will hold constant as wealth grows. For example, life cycle effects are
likely to play a role in how assets are allocated. Typically, older people
hold a larger fraction of safe assets than younger people.
Also, over the second half of last century, the portfolio allocation of
households changed a lot due to financial innovation. Historical pat-
terns show that the share of deposits in financial assets held by
households has declined significantly in the last 20 years. It is conceiv-
able that this decline reflects some kind of constraint on households and
that, if coverage limits were increased, the share of deposits would
increase as well. More likely, it is due to the emergence of attractive
close substitutes for deposits, higher returns on other financial assets,
and improving access by households to these assets. These factors
should reduce households’ demand for deposits. If this effect is strong
enough, the current real amount of coverage might be appropriate
despite being much smaller than it was 20 years ago.
The difficulty in determining the appropriate coverage level has
important implications for indexing. Setting a rule that automatically
adjusts the coverage level makes sense if there is a good index that will
keep the actual coverage level close to its desired level. Lacking such an
index, a rule could be worse than discretionary changes. 
One can point to at least two problems with the House bill’s plan
to index coverage to inflation. First, the initial coverage level chosen
must be just right for indexing to have a chance to work. Since there is
wide uncertainty about what this level should be, it will be difficult to
find the right amount. Furthermore, the level will be very hard to
change once it is decided upon. 
Second, there is no reason to believe that inflation is the right
index. In the above example of an economy where the ratio of nominal
deposits to nominal income (nominal GDP) is constant, coverage limits
should grow faster than inflation. Indeed, they should be indexed to
nominal GDP. Under such a scheme, the $100,000 coverage limit of
1980 would need to rise to about $300,000 in 2002 (Blinder and
Wescott). On the other hand, historical patterns suggest that the
demand for deposits from households has declined, in which case the
nominal coverage should not grow as fast as inflation. In fact, if the
demand for deposits decreases a lot, it might be appropriate to reduce
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Another idea behind coverage limits is that while it might be ineffi-
cient for small, unsophisticated depositors to monitor their banks, this
can be done effectively by more sophisticated depositors. These sophis-
ticated depositors provide some market discipline, which complements
the role of supervisors. It is difficult, however, to establish what the right
coverage limit might be to separate sophisticated from unsophisticated
depositors, or how it might evolve over time.17
Competitive balance between large and small banks. From the per-
spective of economic theory, the principal argument for increasing
coverage is the risk of a decrease in financial stability if the coverage
becomes too small. Surprisingly, few if any of the proponents of such an
increase seem to invoke this argument. Instead, the main argument for
an increase in coverage has to do with redistribution among banks. 
It is often argued that the very biggest banks are “too big to fail.” In
other words, funds in larger banks are safe even if they are not explicitly
insured because the failure of such banks could have a severe impact on
the financial system. Thus, very large banks may be benefiting from an
implicit subsidy. The subsidy arises because, everything else being equal,
a household that wants to deposit an amount larger than the coverage
limit will prefer to put these funds in a bank that is perceived to be too
big to fail. Higher coverage limits reduce the subsidy since it is less likely
that a given household will want to deposit funds in excess of the higher
limit. For these reasons, small banks tend to be in favor of an increase in
the coverage level because they would benefit more than big banks.
FDICIA tried to reduce the size of the implicit subsidy. In particu-
lar, the least-cost resolution provisions limit the ability of the FDIC to
bail out uninsured depositors. Since the introduction of FDICIA, unin-
sured depositors of failed banks have not been protected by the FDIC.
Of course, one cannot guarantee that in the future the FDIC will not
be confronted to a situation requiring such a bailout. Thus, some
implicit subsidy likely remains, although it is probably smaller than it
used to be.
Concerns about competitive balance between big and small banks
are also used to defend two other features of the House bill: setting the
coverage for retirement accounts at $260,000 and the coverage for
municipal accounts at $2 million. The increased coverage for retirement
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quences of the Enron debacle. These accounts can become large and
exceed the current coverage limit. In such a case, for the reasons men-
tioned above, it might be more desirable to place retirement accounts
in a depository institution that is perceived to be too big to fail.
The argument in favor of increased coverage for municipal
deposits is somewhat different. Municipalities handle large amounts of
funds, most of which are not insured, and thus generally require banks
to pledge low-risk securities to cover the funds that are not protected
by the FDIC.18 It appears that some of the smaller banks find it diffi-
cult to hold enough of these low-risk securities to attract municipal
funds. A higher coverage limit would help these institutions since
municipalities would presumably lower the amount of low-risk securi-
ties needed as collateral.
Even if one believes that such measures are desirable on their
own, they have consequences for moral hazard since they increase
the amount of coverage and thus reduce incentives for monitoring.
The argument for increasing the coverage of municipal funds pro-
vides an excellent illustration of how deposit insurance creates
moral hazard.
If the coverage level for these deposits increases, municipalities
would likely lower the amount of collateral they required. Low-
risk securities would be replaced in a bank’s portfolio by loans, or
other riskier assets. This change would make a bank’s portfolio
riskier and the probability of failure higher. Hence, the decrease in
incentives to monitor banks would lead to an increase in risk
taking by these institutions. 
Nevertheless, these measures seem to have only limited benefits for
financial stability. In addition, higher coverage requires a larger fund,
higher premiums, and more supervision and regulation, all of which are
costly to both large and small banks. Moreover, even if small banks are
at a disadvantage, changing the coverage levels might not be the best
way of dealing with the problem (Vaughan and Wheeloch). If the com-
petitive balance in the banking industry needs to be altered, there may
be policies that can achieve that goal without the risk of increasing
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III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This article has provided a guide to the current debate over deposit
insurance reform. Deposit insurance was introduced in the United
States in 1933 to promote financial stability. It seemed a great success at
first, as banks and thrifts experienced over 40 years of stable growth.
Unfortunately, the crisis of the 1980s showed that deposit insurance has
the unfortunate side effect of creating moral hazard—that is, it gives
depository institutions incentives for excessive risk taking. As a response
to the 1980s crisis, FDICIA tried to improve deposit insurance by lim-
iting the moral hazard problem while preserving the benefits of
financial stability. The reforms under discussion today try to improve
the current system by trying to find a better balance between these costs
and benefits.
Some of the issues are uncontroversial and fairly easy to implement.
There is wide agreement that the BIF and the SAIF should be merged,
and that premiums should be made less procyclical. Few people are
opposed to the idea that the size of the fund should be kept within a
given range and that rebates are needed to refund excess premiums
when the fund reaches its limit. 
Risk-based premiums are not controversial in principle, but their
application is challenging. Many analysts believe that such premiums
are a good idea, but because risk is hard to measure, designing such pre-
miums could be difficult. Considerable controversy arises from the
discussion about coverage limits and their indexation. Arguments are
made in terms of economic efficiency and also in terms of competitive
balance between large and small banks.
Lawmakers are currently debating the proposals for deposit
insurance reform. They must weigh the benefits of deposit insur-
ance—financial stability—against the cost of moral hazard. The
magnitude of past problems in the banking system should remind us
how important it is to find the right balance.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 51
ENDNOTES
1 In case of bankruptcy, the liability of bank owners is limited to their invest-
ment. In particular, their personal wealth may not be seized.
2 Suspensions include failed banks as well as banks that suspended operations
temporarily but resumed their activities when conditions became more favorable.
3 There are several ways a bank can be resolved, which include purchase
and assumption transactions, assisted mergers, among others. The bank can
also be closed.
4 Note that the significance of raising coverage limits on deposit insurance to
$100,000 in 1980 was that CDs of $100,000 or more had no interest ceilings.
This allowed brokers to offer fully insured thrift CDs at market rates. 
5 In 1972, two New England states permitted their mutual savings banks to
offer NOW accounts. Other states followed suit. Banks gained NOW account
authority in 1980 under the Monetary Control Act.
6 The charter value of a bank is defined to be the difference between its mar-
ket value and the net value of its assets. One way of estimating charter value is to
compare a bank’s book value with its market value, since charter value is included
in the latter, but not the former. Studying the 25 largest bank holding companies
from 1952 to 1987 shows that market value exceeded book value until the early
1970s, but then started to decrease (Boyd and Rolnick). By the end of the 1970s,
book value had become greater than market value and remained greater through
the end of the study period. 
7 Thrifts were also negatively affected by the growth of the secondary market
in mortgage lending.
8 Well-capitalized banks with CAMELS ratings of 1 and 2 do not pay pre-
miums.
9 Congress passed the Deposit Insurance Fund Act of 1996, which called for
a special assessment on all deposits in the SAIF in order to fully recapitalize the
fund. This assessment turned out to be set at 65.7 basis points.
10 Strictly speaking, there are two funds, one for the banking industry and
one for the thrift industry. However, the key economic issues concerning these
funds are similar.
11 In theory, the optimal size of the fund is reached when the marginal bene-
fit and marginal cost to society of an additional dollar in the fund are equal. The
marginal benefit of each additional dollar in the fund decreases because it becomes
less and less likely that a crisis can exhaust the fund as it becomes larger. The mar-
ginal cost of each additional dollar in the fund probably increases as the behavior
of depository institutions is distorted by the need to pay higher premiums.
12 Some alternative views are expressed on this topic. Some analysts think
that the DRR should be increased to at least 1.5 percent and that there should be
no limits on the overall size of the fund (Thomas). Others think that the fund
should simply be eliminated, since it is only an accounting device. Premiums
could be set to reflect risks imposed on the fund and, the fund having disap-
peared, its size would implicitly not be limited (Feldman).52 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
13 While in principle risk-based premiums are very appealing, they raise many
difficult questions. One big problem with such premiums is that they depend on
appropriately measuring the risk of banks’ portfolios, which is hard to do. If risks
are not measured well, the premiums might not be set in the right way.
A separate point is that risk-based premiums are less effective if risk is not
measured well. Some ways to improve the incentive effects of risk-based premi-
ums have been suggested. For example, more elaborate price schedules, including
state contingent payments, can help prevent moral hazard even when the risks
taken by banks are difficult to assess (Prescott). However, such schemes do not
appear to be considered by the FDIC.
It should also be noted that regulators already penalize bank risk taking
through risk-based capital, PCA and other enforcement actions, early closures,
and other similar measures. If such methods were fully effective, it is not clear
that risk based premiums would be needed at all. If they are not effective—again
because risk is hard to measure—then it is not obvious what benefits risk-based
premiums will have. 
14 However, the highest premium for the best-rated institutions would not
exceed one basis point as long as the ratio of reserves to estimated insured
deposits exceeds 1.15 percent.
15 Choosing a size for the fund is one way to limit the negative consequences
that could arise if the premiums were set too high or too low. If the premiums
were set too high, they would have to be reduced once the maximum size was
reached, thus reducing the burden on depository institutions. If instead the pre-
miums were set too low, the fund would fail to grow fast enough, sending a signal
to policymakers that the financial system was not benefiting from the protection
it needs.
16 Note that limiting the differences between net premiums paid by different
banks is not a concern from the point of view of efficiency. This issue is one of
fairness. Economists do not have much to contribute on the subject, but is seems
to be an important constraint on the design of a system that must be chosen
through a democratic process.
17 It seems sensible to assume that if the demand for deposits increases, it
might also be desirable to increase coverage limits that protect unsophisticated
depositors, while it might be desirable to decrease the limits in the opposite case.
18 Note that individual depositors cannot have their funds backed.
19 In principle, it would be possible for regulators to treat large banks differ-
ently from small banks. For example, it has been argued that larger banks should
be required to hold some subordinated debt. Because such debt is not insured,
this would provide a market-based signal of the riskiness of those banks. Impos-
ing tighter regulations on large banks in such ways might reduce the implicit sub-
sidy, while at the same time promoting prudent, rather than risky, behavior.ECONOMIC REVIEW • FIRST QUARTER 2003 53
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